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The Agreement on Textiles and Clothing established the textile and clothing safeguards 
regime from 1995 to 2004. The current safeguards regime for these products is defined 
in terms of the Agreement on Safeguards, the China Textile Safeguards, and the China 
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also reviews safeguard actions to date to provide a sense of continued managed trade in 
this area.  
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Introduction 
or the decade of 1995 to 2004, the safeguard regime for world trade in textiles 
and clothing was that of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC).
1 
Currently, the world trading system is in a new era of textiles and clothing safeguards 
that is fundamentally more complex and less transparent than was the regime under 
the ATC. Consequently, it is useful to assess the transition in regime and to speculate 
as to its future trajectory. In this article, we begin this assessment by summarizing the 
ten years of safeguard actions under the ATC. We then discuss the three current 
safeguard options that World Trade Organization member countries have access to 
under WTO agreements. These are: the Agreement on Safeguards; the China Textile 
Safeguards (CTS), available until 2008 under the China Accession Protocol; and the 
China Product-specific Safeguards (CPSS), available until 2013, also under the China 
Accession Protocol. We examine each of these safeguard options, summarizing our 
results in table 1. All indications suggest that this will be an active area of trade policy 
deliberations, with implications both within and beyond the textile and clothing 
sectors. 
II. ATC Safeguard Activities  
uring the ten years of the ATC regime, there were a total 55 safeguard actions. 
The ATC provisions are summarized in table 1, and the safeguard actions 
themselves are summarized in table 2.
2 The first notable fact from table 2 is the large 
number of safeguard actions brought by the United States in 1995, actions that caused 
consternation for textile and clothing exporters, trade policy analysts, and the Textile 
Monitoring Body (TMB).
3 Eight of these twenty-three actions were sustained, and 
three resulted in dispute settlement processes.
4 The year 1996 saw only one U.S. 
action but seven actions brought by Brazil and two actions brought by Ecuador. Five 
of the Brazilian actions, all against South Korea, were sustained. 
The year 1998 saw one case brought by the United States and four cases brought 
by Colombia. The U.S. action was sustained. The year 1999 saw another case brought 
by the United States and a total of ten cases brought by Argentina. The U.S. case 
proved to be contentious and resulted in dispute settlement proceedings.
5 In all ten of 
the 1999 Argentina actions, as well as in three additional cases brought by Argentina 
in 2000, the target countries were Brazil, Pakistan, and Korea. Argentina’s motivations 
in these thirteen cases reflected the devaluation of the Brazilian real in January 1999 
and the subsequent balance of payments and political problems that developed during 
1999 and 2000.
6 The TMB upheld only two of the thirteen actions brought by 
Argentina (cases against Pakistan and Korea), and even here it imposed some 
F 
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additional conditions. In addition, Argentina’s actions against Brazil resulted in 
dispute settlement proceedings.
7 
Table 1  A Summary of Safeguard Provisions on Textile and Clothing Products 
Dimension  ATC AOS CTS  CPSS 
Legal foundation  The Agreement on 
Textiles and Clothing, 
Art. 6. 
The Agreement on 
Safeguards and Art. XIX 
of the GATT 1994. 
Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession 
of China, para. 242. 
Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession 
of China, para. 245-250. 
Protocol of the 
Accession of the 
People’s Republic of 
China, Art. 16. 
Invoking criteria  Article 6.2: In such 
increased quantities as 
to cause serious 
damage, or actual threat 
thereof, to the domestic 
industry.  
Article 2.1: In such 
increased quantities, 
absolute or relative to 
domestic production, 
and under such 
conditions as to cause 
or threaten to cause 
serious injury to the 
domestic industry. 
Para. 242(a): Due to 
market disruption, 
threatening to impede 
the orderly development 
of trade.  
Article 16.1: In such 
increased quantities or 
under such conditions 
as to cause or threaten 
to cause market 
disruption. 
Article 16.8: Causes or 
threatens to cause 




Article 6.2: Serious 
damage or actual threat 
thereof must 
demonstrably be caused 
by such increased 
quantities in total 
imports of that product 
and not by such other 
factors as technological 
changes or changes in 
consumer preference.  
Article 4.2: When factors 
other than increased 
imports are causing 
injury to the domestic 
industry at the same 
time, such injury shall 
not be attributed to 
increased imports. 
Para. 242(a): 
- The existence or threat 
of market disruption; 
- the role of products of 
Chinese origin in that 
disruption. 
Article 16.4: 
- The volume of imports; 
- the effect of imports of 
such product on prices 
in the market of 
importing countries; 
- the effect of imports of 




No  Yes  No  No 
Transparency  Notify to the Textile 
Monitoring Body 
Notify to the Committee 
on Safeguards 
No requirements  Notify to the Committee 
on Safeguards 
Quota level and 
growth level 
Article 6.8: Not lower 
than the actual level of 
exports or imports 
during 12-month period 
terminating 2 months 
preceding month in 
which request for 
consultation was made. 
Article 6.13: Quota can 
grow at least 6% per 
year. 
Article 5.1: Not lower 
than the average of 
imports in the last three 
representative years for 
which statistics are 
available. 
Article 7.4: Restraint 
must be lower than 
previous year (no 
specific rate). 
Para. 242(c): Quota 
grows 7.5 % (6 % for 
wool products) above 
the amount entered 
during the first 12 
months of the most 
recent 14 months 
preceding the month in 






Article 6.12: Up to three 
years. 
Article 7: Four years, 
with option to extend 
four more years once. 
Para. 242(f): One year, 




No  Article 8.1: Trade 
compensation for the 
adverse effects of the 
measure on their trade. 
No  Article 16.6: Right of 
suspension after two 
years of safe-guard 
measure in case of a 
relative increase and 
after three years in case 
of an absolute increase.    S. Kim and K. Reinert 
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Table 2  A Summary of ATC Safeguard Actions, 1995 to 2004 
Item  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Total
Total number  23  10  0  5  11  3  1  0  2  0  53 
Number by US 23  1  0  1  1  0  0  0  0  0  26 
By Argentina  0  0  0  0  10  3  0  0  0  0  13 
By Brazil  0  7  0  0  0  0  0  0  2  0  9 
By Ecuador  0  2  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  2 
By Colombia  0  0  0  4  0  0  0  0  0  0  4 
By Poland  0  0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1 
Article 6.9
a  9  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  2  0  12 
Article 6.10
a  14  1  0  4  1  0  1  0  0  0  21 
Article 6.11
a  0  9  0  0  10  3  0  0  0  0  22 
Dispute cases
b 3  0  0  0  6
c  0  0  0  0  0  9 
a At introduction, though the category might have subsequently changed. 
b Actual date when a case was brought into the DSB may differ from the date the case was introduced 
to the TMB.
  
c Five cases were by Brazil against Argentina. 
The use of the ATC safeguard provisions by Latin American countries was 
notable. Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia are members of the Geneva-based 
International Textile and Clothing Bureau (ITCB). The ITCB took a relatively strong 
position against ATC safeguard actions. For example, in its 2001 Rio de Janeiro 
Communiqué, the ITCB Council of Representatives stated that the council “resolved 
to resist any trade harassment measures by [major developed restraining countries], 
such as unjustified recourse to antidumping, safeguards and/or changes in rules of 
origin” (ITCB, 2001). There was thus some evidence of potential mixed motives 
within the ITCB membership. As we will discuss below, this combination of mixed 
motives was intensified when Chinese exports increased after the phase-out of the 
ATC.
8 
The year 2001 saw only one case, that by Poland against Romania. This was the 
first time the ATC safeguard provision was invoked by a European country.
9 The TMB 
found this action to be unjustified, and Poland subsequently rescinded the measure. 
There were not many safeguard activities during the final three years, from 2002 to 
2004. There were only two cases in 2003, by Brazil against Taiwan and the Republic 
of Korea.
10 Even these two new cases did not attract much attention since the 
measures were justified by the TMB and terminated in December 2004.
11  
ATC Article 6 stated that safeguard actions were to be used “as sparingly as 
possible,” and this language was reiterated at the Singapore WTO Ministerial. The 
safeguard actions of the United States in 1995 and of Argentina in 1999 suggest that   S. Kim and K. Reinert 
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this language was not always respected in the beginning. However, after the intensive 
safeguard use by the United States in the first year of the ATC and by the Latin 
American countries during the mid period of the ATC, WTO members became more 
circumspect.  
Article 8.10 of the ATC allowed members unable to conform to the “further 
recommendations” of the TMB to bring the matter before the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body (DSB). This occurred in nine of the fifty-five safeguard cases. The 
first three cases, one in 1995 and the other two in 1996, involved exports of, 
respectively, cotton and man-made fibre underwear from Costa Rica to the United 
States, woven wool shirts and blouses from India to the United States, and women’s 
and girls’ wool coats from India to the United States. The U.S.–Underwear case was 
notable in that the Appellate Body ruled that safeguard restraints could not be applied 
retroactively as under the old Multi-fibre Arrangement (MFA) regime.
12 The U.S.–
Woven Wool Shirts and Blouses case was also notable in that the DSB panel found 
that a lack of TMB endorsement was not sufficient grounds for an exporting country 
to demand the removal of a restraint.
13 This latter issue arose when a consultation 
began over “serious damage” and the TMB made a recommendation over “actual 
threat thereof.” 
The remainder of the nine cases, brought to the DSB in 1999, involved exports of 
combed cotton yarn from Pakistan to the United States and exports of a number of 
items from Brazil to Argentina. The U.S.–Combed Cotton Yarn case was notable in 
that the DSB and Appellate Body concluded that a “product” approach to the 
definition of the domestic industry was superior to the “producer” view utilized by the 
United States. In doing so, the DSB panel clearly distinguished the ATC from the 
MFA, thus proscribing the United States from invoking the less stringent safeguard 
measures under the MFA.
14 The U.S.–Combed Cotton Yarn case also stressed the 
superiority of multilateralism over regional favouritism by ruling that the United 
States failed to justify a serious damage to the domestic industry due to exclusion of 
import data from Mexico, a NAFTA partner. The Brazil vs. Argentina dispute case 
was important in that a regional dispute settlement mechanism, in the form of 
MERCOSUR, was able to solve the disputes before the DSB panel process took place 
at the WTO. 
While in some sense a thing of the past, the ATC dispute settlement history will be 
important as a precedent when WTO members invoke the dispute settlement 
mechanism in future safeguard actions, as no doubt they will. 
III. Future Safeguard Activities 
eginning in 2005, the transitional safeguard provisions of the ATC were no 
longer available. Except in the case of exports from China, all safeguard actions  B   S. Kim and K. Reinert 
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against textile and clothing imports are now subject to the WTO Agreement on 
Safeguards. In the case of textile and clothing exports from China, WTO member 
countries can utilize the “special textile safeguard” provisions of the China Accession 
Protocol through 2008. We refer to these as the China Textile Safeguards (CTS).
15 
Also, in the case of textile and clothing imports from China, WTO member counties 
can utilize the “product-specific safeguard” provisions of the China Accession 
Protocol through 2013. We refer to these as the China Product-specific Safeguards 
(CPSS). However, WTO member countries cannot invoke both of the latter two 
options for the same products at the same time.
16 We consider each of these three 
options in turn with reference to table 1.  
The Agreement on Safeguards 
WTO member countries have recourse to the Agreement on Safeguards for safeguard 
measures against all products covered in the ATC (see table 1). In general, the 
Agreement on Safeguards allows WTO member countries to invoke safeguard 
measures when “such product is being imported into its territory in such increased 
quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to 
cause or threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like or 
directly competitive products” (Agreement on Safeguards, Article 2.1). The 
Agreement on Safeguards requires WTO member countries imposing safeguard 
actions to prove a causal link between serious injury and the imports of the product 
concerned (Article 4.2(b)) and to report measures to the Committee on Safeguards 
immediately upon embarking on an investigation (Article 11). 
Although there has been some controversy over the nature of the Agreement on 
Safeguards as a retrogression from full trade liberalization, its provisions have some 
advantages for exporters in comparison to ATC Article 6.
17 This is illustrated in table 
1. Textile and clothing exporting countries can now benefit from nondiscrimination 
and retaliation provisions, which did not exist under the ATC. Under the Agreement 
on Safeguards, WTO member countries cannot impose safeguard measures on imports 
from a specific country alone, and this Most Favored Nation (MFN) discipline will 
prevent distorted trade flows. Furthermore, the exporting countries whose exports are 
being restricted can request compensation or retaliate except in the case of an absolute 
increase of imports, which prohibits retaliation for the first three years of restrictions 
(Article 8). This compensation/retaliation provision could act as a deterrent to weakly 
justified safeguard efforts by importing countries. 
There are, however, negative effects for exporting countries under the Agreement 
on Safeguards. These include the longer duration of safeguard measures, which can be 
imposed up to eight years (Article 7.3), and unclearly specified quota growth rates. 
Under the ATC, the quota level must have increased no less than 6 percent of the   S. Kim and K. Reinert 
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previous year’s level, but there is no specific level required under the Agreement on 
Safeguards except for the basic guideline that restraints must be lower than the 
previous years (Article 7.4). This might prove to be detrimental to exporters’ interests. 
China Textile Safeguards 
China Textile Safeguard or CTS provisions did not appear in the Draft Protocol on the 
Accession of the People’s Republic of China (China Accession Protocol) but were 
added as a part of China’s accession arrangement later on, appearing in the Report of 
the Working Party on the Accession of China (Working Party Report). These special 
safeguard provisions have been criticized as discriminatory measures by economists 
and trade analysts.
18 Therefore, it is important to examine whether the CTS provisions 
have the potential to undo what the ATC safeguard provisions achieved during their 
ten-year transitional period.  
Under the CTS, a WTO member can request a consultation with China when it 
believes that “imports of Chinese origin of textiles and apparel products covered by 
the ATC…, were, due to market disruption, threatening to impede the orderly 
development of trade in these products” (para. 242.a). Thirty days are given before the 
beginning of an actual consultation. The WTO member concerned and China are 
given 90 days to produce a “mutually satisfactory solution” (para. 242.b). The 
consultation, however, can be extended if China and the WTO member concerned 
agree. Upon receipt of the request for consultation, China would impose a voluntary 
restriction on shipments of “textile or textile products [to the requesting WTO 
member] in the category or categories subject to these consultations to a level no 
greater than 7.5 percent (6 percent for wool products categories) above the amount 
entered during the first 12 months of the most recent 14 months preceding the month 
in which the request for consultations was made” (para. 242.c).  
If a mutually satisfactory solution cannot be reached, the two parties continue the 
consultation process, and the imposed restriction continues (para. 242.d). The 
restriction, however, can only continue up to 12 months, depending on its starting 
point. The Working Party Report specifies that “no action taken under this provision 
would remain in effect beyond one year, without reapplication” (para. 242.f). 
However, through a bilateral agreement between China and the WTO member 
concerned, the restriction period can be extended beyond 12 months until December 
31, 2008, the CTS expiration date. Alternately, WTO member countries can reapply 
the restriction. Therefore, effectively, the CTS restrictions can last until 2008.  
The CTS provisions can be compared with the ATC safeguard provisions with 
regard to the following issues: invoking criteria, causal link requirement, transparency, 
and duration of restriction (see table 1). We consider each in turn.   S. Kim and K. Reinert 
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First, unlike the ATC safeguard provisions, the CTS provisions do not provide 
detailed guidelines for determining “serious damage or actual threat thereof.” Instead, 
the special textile safeguard provisions replace “serious damage, or actual threat 
thereof” under the ATC safeguard provisions with “market disruption.” The question 
is whether there is a significant difference between these two criteria. It is, in fact, not 
clear what “market disruption” means in the CTS.
19 One definition can be found in the 
Multifibre Arrangement (MFA); another appears in Article 16 of the China Accession 
Protocol, the CPSS mechanism discussed below. The CPSS defines market disruption 
as the situation when “a significant cause of material injury, or threat of material 
injury to the domestic industry” occurs due to the rapid increase “either absolutely or 
relatively, of imports of an article, like or directly competitive with an article produced 
by the domestic industry” (emphasis added). On the other hand, the MFA required for 
the determination of market disruption the demonstration of “the existence of serious 
damage to domestic producers or actual threat thereof.”
20 Interestingly, the definition 
of market disruption in the China Accession Protocol seems looser than that in the 
MFA.
21 Despite uncertainty as to the meaning of the term, it is clear that importing 
countries enjoy more room to define market disruption on their own unless the matter 
is soon clarified by the dispute settlement process.
22   
Second, the CTS provisions on the criteria used to investigate market disruption 
and to establish a causal link between imports and market disruption are not as clear 
as the ATC safeguard provisions.
23 As to criteria, the CTS provisions do not provide 
any specific guideline for what conditions are required to prove the market disruption 
is preventing the “orderly development of trade.” By the same token, the special 
textile safeguard provisions do not provide specific guidelines for determining a 
causal link, although they require a “detailed factual statement” demonstrating “(1) 
the existence or threat of market disruption; and (2) the role of products of Chinese 
origin in that disruption.”
24  
The lack of specific guidelines may enable the importing countries to invoke 
safeguard measures under the CTS provisions with more ease than they could under 
the ATC. In the case of the United States, action under the CTS requires as the proof 
of a causal link a “description of how the Chinese origin textile and apparel product(s) 
have adversely affected the domestic industry producing like or directly competitive 
articles, such as the effect of imports from China on prices in the United States or any 
other data deemed to be pertinent.”
25 In its request for consultations with China under 
the CTS in the case of knit fabric (category 222) in 2003, the United States used only 
the average unit price of Chinese imports as proof of the role of Chinese imports in 
market disruption. This might be interpreted as abuse of the CTS provisions.  
Third, transparency requirements under the CTS provisions are less clearly set out 
than they were under the ATC, a fact reminiscent of the MFA era.
26 There is no   S. Kim and K. Reinert 
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specific requirement for any of the parties to report to a WTO body equivalent to the 
TMB under the ATC, or even to report to the Committee on Safeguards.  
Finally, compared to the three-year duration for restrictions under the ATC, longer 
CTS restrictions have been possible if they were originally imposed before the end of 
2005. In fact, reapplication of prior safeguard measures under the CTS has been 
attempted in some cases.
27 That said, the CTS provisions do expire in 2008, which 
limits their duration.  
The CTS provisions are very similar to the “provisional unilateral restraint” under 
ATC Article 6.11 in that immediate restrictions (voluntary export restriction in the 
case of the CTS and import restriction under the ATC) are to be implemented upon 
receipt of a consultation request. Considering the fact that the “provisional unilateral 
restraint” under the ATC Article 6.11 was designed to prevent damage caused by the 
delay of safeguard measures in “highly unusual and critical circumstances” (emphases 
added), CTS actions can be seen to be more trade distorting than those under the ATC.  
China Product-specific Safeguards 
In addition to CTS actions, WTO members can pursue safeguard actions through the 
China Product-specific Safeguards or CPSS.
28 WTO members can seek safeguard 
measures either through the CTS or through the CPSS until 2008, but cannot invoke 
the two simultaneously.
29 When CTS provisions expire in 2008, WTO members can 
then rely on the CPSS provisions through 2013.  
Under the CPSS, a WTO member can request a consultation with China in “cases 
where products of Chinese origin are being imported … in such increased quantities 
or under such conditions as to cause or threaten to cause market disruption to the 
domestic producers of like or directly competitive products.”
30 If China and the WTO 
member concerned fail to reach a mutually satisfactory solution, the WTO member 
requesting consultation can impose safeguard measures without any retaliation for two 
years in the case of a relative increase and for three years in the case of an absolute 
increase (Article 16.6). As under the ATC, the importing countries can invoke 
provisional safeguard measures for 200 days under “critical circumstances.”
31 Unlike 
the CTS provisions, the CPSS provisions require that all activities and actions by 
WTO members and China be notified to the Committee on Safeguards.  
The CPSS provisions can be compared with the ATC safeguard provisions with 
regard to the following issues: causal link requirement, duration of restrictions, quota 
growth rate, and the trade diversion provision (see table 1). We consider each in turn. 
First, as in the CTS provisions, instead of serious damage or threat thereof, market 
disruption is used as a criterion for safeguard invocation (Article 16.1). This definition 
of “market disruption” can be found in the CPSS Article 16.4.
32 It defines “market 
disruption” as the situation when “a significant cause of material injury, or threat of   S. Kim and K. Reinert 
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material injury to the domestic industry” occurs due to the rapid increase “either 
absolutely or relatively” of “imports of an article, like or directly competitive with an 
article produced by the domestic industry” (emphasis added).
33  
Critically, the definition of market disruption is found in the phrase “a significant 
cause of material injury,” allowing importers a less stringent material injury test that 
only requires importing countries to show proof of “significant cause” rather than of 
real “material injury or threat thereof.”
34 The phrase “significant cause of material 
injury” later appeared in a revised format, namely “any material injury or threat of 
material injury,” in the transitional safeguard section of the Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of China, which aimed to clarify CPSS implementation 
issues.
35 Either injury test threshold is in fact much less stringent than that of the ATC 
and even that of the MFA, where demonstration of the “existence of serious damage 
to domestic products or actual threat thereof” was required.
36 This problem reflects the 
fact that China WTO accession negotiations involved bilateral negotiations between 
China and the United States, beginning even before the establishment of the ATC.
37  
Second, with regard to the duration of restrictions, the CPSS is vague except for a 
general criterion that allows countries to “limit import only to the extent necessary to 
prevent or remedy such market disruption” (Article 16.3). Thus, it is possible for 
importing countries to restrict textile imports from China until 2013 if they can 
provide rational reasons. However, China can retaliate after two years of restriction in 
the case of relative increase and three years in the case of an absolute increase (Article 
16.6).  
Third, the CPSS provisions do not specify any requirement for the growth rate of 
quotas on imports. Under the ATC, import quotas grew up to 6 percent annually. By 
the design of the safeguard mechanism of the CTS, imports from China can grow up 
to 7.5 percent from the starting point of restrictions. Although the Agreement on 
Safeguards does not provide a specific number for the growth rate on import quotas, it 
requires the import level under restrictions to be higher than the average level of the 
previous three years. Therefore, quota growth under the CPSS is the most trade-
distorting measure among the four safeguard measures considered here. 
Finally, the CPSS provisions allow a third WTO member country potentially 
affected by the safeguard actions of another WTO member country on imports from 
China to utilize safeguard actions against China’s products without providing proof of 
injury or even the diversion itself. As noted by Messerlin (2004), “As soon as one 
WTO member implements a transitional product-specific safeguard measure against 
Chinese exports, all other members can enforce a similar measure at almost no 
procedural cost (no investigation, no prior notification, no input from Chinese 
parties)” (p. 127). This trade-diversion provision thus has the potential to cause a 
cascade of safeguard actions against China.
38   S. Kim and K. Reinert 
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IV. Post-ATC Safeguard Activities to Date 
e next consider the activities to date under the China Textile Safeguards 
(CTS), the China Product-specific Safeguards (CPSS), and the Agreement on 
Safeguards (AS) in order to, at least in a preliminary way, assess the trajectory of 
future safeguard activities. As would be expected, most of the safeguard activities to 
date have been under the CTS rather than the CPSS or the AS.  
China Textile Safeguards 
With the expiration of the textile quota regime under the ATC, textile and clothing 
manufacturers in the United States and the EU responded quickly. Consequently, 
procedures under the CTS provisions began to emerge from the EU and the United 
States, as well as from other countries such as Brazil and Peru. Much of the activity 
through July 2005 was caught up in deliberations over China’s exchange rate 
arrangements, which were alleged to be “unfair” by importers.
39 It is important to note 
that, as mentioned above, there is no requirement for notification of safeguard actions 
to the WTO under the CTS. These actions, therefore, are largely bilateral in nature.  
As in the initial history of the ATC, the United States has emerged as the most 
frequent user of CTS actions, initiating consultation processes for three groups of 
products from China in 2003, one in 2004, and nine in 2005.
40 The consultations for 
safeguard actions in 2003 and 2004 did not result in a mutually satisfactory solution. 
Consequently, according to the CTS provisions, all measures in 2003 and 2004 lasted 
for one year and were reapplied in 2005. With regard to the actions in 2005, none of 
the consultations with China resulted in a mutually satisfactory solution, and all 
measures were set to expire at the end of 2005.
41 The EU also initiated investigations 
regarding seven product categories in April 2005 and requested consultations for T-
shirts and flax yarns in May 2005. The safeguard actions by the EU and the United 
States angered the Chinese government and, in response, it withdrew its voluntary 
export tariffs on certain textile products and threatened to bring matters to the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body. 
In June 2005, the EU and China were able to reach a mutually satisfactory 
solution on restrictions on the two product categories, as well as on other categories 
under investigation. Subject to the approval of the EU members, the EU is now able to 
limit the imports of ten categories of products until 2008.
42 The growth rate of imports 
of these products is to be from 8 percent to 12.4 percent annually, depending on the 
product categories and a specific year of restrictions.
43 
Encouraged by this agreement, trade representatives of the Chinese and U.S. 
governments held several meetings in 2005. These consultations were more difficult 
than those between the EU and China, however. In the meantime, the actions by 
American textile exporters continued. In July 2005, U.S. textile exporters filed new 
W   S. Kim and K. Reinert 
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requests for safeguard actions against the imports of four textile products from 
China.
44 Despite these difficulties, the United States and China were able to sign a 
memorandum of agreement on import-level restraints on twenty-one categories of 
clothing and textile products from China through 2008.
45 The annual growth rate of 
imports of these products was limited to 10 percent in 2006, 12.5 percent in 2007, and 
15 percent in 2008 for clothing products, and 12.5 percent in 2006 and 2007 and 16 
percent in 2008 for textile products. In viewing the product categories, it is clear that 
this represents managed trade across a broad swath of textile and clothing products, 
albeit from a single country only.   
These EU and U.S. actions were influenced by political concerns. For example, in 
the EU, the referendum for the EU Constitution influenced the decision to pursue 
textile safeguard measures against China. Facing potential defeat of the referendum in 
particular EU member countries, the EU decided that initiating actions would 
influence public perceptions of trade liberalization.  
China Product-specific Safeguards 
Safeguard actions under the CPSS were initiated by Peru at the end of 2003. This was 
in response to the Peruvian government’s finding that “conditions for an immediate 
application of provisional transitional safeguards to Chinese textile clothing articles 
had been met, and that if these measures were not taken, the domestic industry that 
supplies the local market would suffer an injury that would be very difficult to repair” 
(Webb, Camminati, and Thorne, 2005, p. 27). These provisional safeguard measures 
were in existence for 200 days beginning in December 2003.
46 The expiration of these 
measures in June 2004 was accompanied by much political pressure on the 
government (including by the Chinese Embassy in Peru against further activity under 
the CPSS), resulting in further action being taken under the Agreement on Safeguards 
(see below). In June 2005, Brazil also had announced that it would begin to utilize 
CPSS actions against Chinese exports, putting in place decrees (numbers 5.556 and 
5.5580) to make this possible. In September 2005, these safeguard measures appeared 
imminent, and provisional safeguards were introduced in November 2005. This was 
followed by a memorandum of understanding between Brazil and China in February 
2006, the details of which were worked out during the December 2005 WTO 
Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong.
47 Similar actions have been pursued by Argentina, 
Colombia, South Africa, and Turkey.
48  
The Agreement on Safeguards 
In 2004, Peru notified the Committee on Safeguards of its investigation of potential 
serious injury to its domestic textile industry, with an aim to invoke safeguard 
measures on certain textile products from selected countries.
49 This action drew some 
concern from the EU regarding its impact on the full liberalization of the textile and   S. Kim and K. Reinert 
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clothing trade.
50 In October 2004, Peru notified its intention to adopt provisional 
safeguard actions against selected countries for 200 days.
51 The provisional measures 
were terminated in May 2005 without any further action.
52 While this case did not 
attract much attention from other WTO member countries, after 2013, the Agreement 
on Safeguards is where safeguard activities that pertain to trade in textiles and 
clothing will be concentrated. 
V. Summary 
his article has reviewed and assessed four safeguard regimes for trade in textiles 
and clothing. These are the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, the Agreement 
on Safeguards, the China Textile Safeguards, and the China Product-specific 
Safeguards. With the end of the ATC regime in 2004, textile safeguard activity became 
concentrated under the CTS. However, between 2008 and 2013, activity will focus on 
the CPSS. Thereafter, the AS will take over. The CTS and the CPSS are less liberal 
than the ATC regime and, in some specific areas, even less liberal than the pre-ATC 
regime, the Multi-fibre Arrangement. For this reason, analysis of the 2005 through 
2013 period as an example of continued managed trade in textiles and clothing will be 
of interest. The actions of major players, namely the United States, the European 
Union, and China, will be the primary focus, but other developing countries have been 
and will continue to be involved. Activity under the CTS provisions suggests that, for 
better or worse, managed trade across a large array of textile and clothing products is 
alive and well 45 years after the initiation of such policies.  
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Endnotes 
                                                      
1.   For the drafting history of the ATC, see Raffaelli and Jenkins (1995). For its 
general outlines, see Reinert (2000). 
2.   ATC safeguard actions took place under the provisions of Article 6. Article 6.7 
provided for a consultation process in which a WTO member proposing a 
safeguard action informed the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB) of a consultation 
request. If the consultation process yielded a “mutual understanding that the 
situation calls for restraint on the exports” (ATC Article 6.8), then an agreed 
restraint was the result. If the consultation process did not lead to a mutual 
understanding, a proposed unilateral restraint could have resulted (ATC Article 
6.10). Alternatively, “In highly unusual and critical circumstances, where delay 
would cause damage which would be difficult to repair,” a member could have   S. Kim and K. Reinert 
 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy    171
                                                                                                                                            
imposed a provisional unilateral restraint “on the condition that the request for 
consultation and notification to the TMB [would] be effected within no more than 
five working days after taking the action” (Article 6.11).  
3.   See Textile Monitoring Body (1997), Baughman et al. (1997), and Reinert (2000).    
4.   On these dispute settlement cases, see Tang (1998) and Reinert (2000).  
5.   On this dispute settlement case, see Kim, Reinert, and Rodrigo (2002). 
6.   Argentina also imposed antidumping actions during this time, one of which, that 
against Italian ceramic tile, went to the Dispute Settlement Body. 
7.   Again, see Kim, Reinert, and Rodrigo (2002). 
8.   As we will discuss below, a few ITCB members initiated safeguard procedures 
either under the China Textile Safeguards or the China Product-specific 
Safeguards, although the ITCB Council of Representatives issued its 2005 Bali 
Communiqué confirming that it “resolved to make determined efforts for further 
liberalization of trade in textiles and clothing.” For the ITCB position, see 
International Textile and Clothing Bureau (2005). 
9.   The lack of European involvement in ATC safeguards is not a sign of a lack of 
protection. Rather, it is a sign of a preference for antidumping actions within the 
European Union. See Vermulst and Mihayloya ( 2001) and Messerlin (2004). 
10.  During this period, there were requests by the United States for consultation with 
the Chinese government regarding certain textile and clothing products under the 
China Product-specific Safeguards. Since these safeguard actions were outside the 
scope of the ATC, we discuss them below in a separate section. 
11.  In February 2003, Brazil notified the TMB of its agreed restraints of some woven 
fabric products under ATC Article 6.9 against imports from Taiwan and the 
Republic of Korea separately. The TMB found these measures to be consistent 
with Article 6. The restraint lasted until December 2004. See Textile Monitoring 
Body (2003).  
12.  See Dispute Settlement Body (1997a).  
13.  See Dispute Settlement Body (1997b).  
14.  See Dispute Settlement Body (2001).  
15.  See Working Party on the Accession of China (2001).  
16.  Working Party on the Accession of China (2001), para. 242(g). Some argue that 
the products under the CTS should not continue to be subject to import 
restrictions under the CPSS upon the expiration of the CTS in 2008. See Huang 
(2006). 
17.  For a negative view on the Agreement on Safeguards, see Finger (1996). A more 
recent analysis is provided by Sykes (2003). 
18.  See Spadi (2002) and Liu and Sun (2004). 
19.  There is no definition of “market disruption” in the CTS safeguard provisions. 
See Working Party on the Accession of China (2001), para 242. 
20.  See Annex A of GATT (1974).  
21.  Huang (2006) argued that the definition of market disruption in CTS must be 
based on the definition under Article 16.4 of the CPSS.   
22.  See Spadi (2002).    S. Kim and K. Reinert 
 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy    172
                                                                                                                                            
23.  Article 6.2 of the ATC required the complaining party to prove that damage not 
be caused by such factors as “technological changes or changes in consumer 
preference.” 
24.  Working Party on the Accession of China (2001), para 242(a). 
25.  See The United States Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements 
(2003). 
26.  See Nordås (2004).  
27.  In December 2004, the Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements 
of the United States made a notification in the Federal Register regarding 
reapplication of the restrictions imposed in 2003. See the United States 
Committee for the Implementation of Textile Agreements (2004).  
28.  The impacts of the CPSS on textile and clothing exports from China were 
reviewed by Liu and Sun (2004). However, their focus on the CPSS to evaluate 
the impact on China’s textile exports might have been somewhat misleading 
since, as discussed below, the CTS provisions have been rather extensively used.  
29.  See Working Party on the Accession of China (2001), para. 242(g). 
30.  World Trade Organization (2001), Article 16.1.  
31.  See World Trade Organization (2001), Article 16.7.  
32.  See World Trade Organization (2001), Article 16.4.  
33.  See World Trade Organization (2001), Article 16.4 and Ma (2004). 
34.  See Liu and Sun (2004).  
35.  See Working Party on the Accession of China (2001).  
36.  See Annex A of GATT (1974). The definition of “market disruption” was applied 
loosely under the MFA because there was not a robust dispute settlement 
mechanism to settle the conflicts among exporting and importing countries. See 
Spadi (2002). 
37.  See Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China (2001), para. 1 and 
Spadi (2002). With regard to the general provisions for accession under the WTO, 
Hoekman and Kostecki (2001) noted that “A key aspect of this ostensibly 
multilateral proceeding is its bilateral component. Accession negotiations are held 
between the acceding government and all members interested in enhancing their 
access to the markets of the country seeking membership … . The bottom line is 
that a country that desires to enter the WTO is a demandeur” (pp. 66-67). In the 
specific case of China, these authors noted that “China must accept that WTO 
members have the right to impose measures of contingent protection on the basis 
of criteria that do not conform to the WTO” (p. 405). 
38.  See also Liu and Sun (2003). 
39.  The July 2005 move to a currency-basket peg, despite the very modest 
revaluation involved, was certainly to be welcomed. Further moves towards a 
managed float must eventually take place. It needs to be emphasized that a move 
to managed floating does not necessitate that China remove its capital controls. In 
fact, keeping these controls in place is probably wise given fragility in the Chinese 
banking system. There is, therefore, less concern about exchange rate volatility as 
a consequence of introducing flexibility into China’s currency arrangements than 
is often alleged.   S. Kim and K. Reinert 
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40.  In December 2003, quantitative restrictions were imposed on knit fabric (category 
222), brassieres and other body-supporting garments (category 349/649), and 
cotton and man-made fibre dressing gowns and robes (category 350/650). In 
October 2004, a one-year trade limit was imposed on cotton, wool, and man-made 
fibre socks. On May 20, 2005, a restriction that was to expire at the end of 2005 
was imposed on cotton knit shirts and blouses (category 338/339), cotton trousers 
(category 347/348), and cotton and man-made fibre underwear (category 
352/652). In addition, in May 2005, combed cotton yarn (category 301), men’s 
and boys’ cotton and man-made fibre shirts, not knit (category 360/640), man-
made fibre knit shirts and blouses (category 638/639), and man-made fibre 
trousers (category 647/648) were also restrained with a trade limit that lasted 
through December 2005. In September 2005, restrictions were imposed on certain 
cotton and man-made fibre brassieres and other body-supporting garments 
(category 349/649) and other synthetic filament fabric (category 620) until the end 
of 2005. 
41.  There have been twenty-seven requests, of which ten were reapplications of 2004 
and 2005 safeguards. All of the safeguard investigations were terminated after the 
United States and China signed a pact on the import limit on certain textile and 
clothing products in November 2005.  
42.  See European Union (2005). The products included are pullovers, men’s trousers, 
blouses, T-shirts, dresses, brassieres, flax yarn, cotton fabrics, bed linen, and table 
and kitchen linen. 
43.  Again, see European Union (2005).  
44.  See American Manufacturing Trade Action Coalition (2005). The four products 
were women’s and girls’ cotton and man-made fibre woven shirts (category 
341/641), cotton and man-made fibre skirts (category 342/642), cotton and man-
made fibre nightwear (category 351/651), and cotton and man-made fibre 
swimwear (category 359-S/659-S). 
45.  See United States Trade Representative (2005). The covered products are sewing 
thread and combed cotton yarn (category 200/301), knit fabric (category 222), 
special purpose fabric (category 229), hosiery (category 332/432/632), cotton knit 
shirts (part category 338/339), men’s and boys’ woven shirts (category 340/640), 
sweaters (category 345/645/646), cotton trousers (category 347/348), cotton and 
man-made fibre brassieres and other body-supporting garments (category 
349/649), cotton and man-made fibre underwear (category 352/652), cotton and 
man-made fibre swimwear (359-S/659-S), pile towels (363), men’s and boys’ 
wool suits (category 443), men’s and boys’ wool trousers (category 447), 
polyester filament fabric (category 619), other synthetic filament fabric (category 
620), glass fabric (622), man-made fibre knit shirts (part category 638/639), man-
made fibre trousers (part 647/648), window blinds and shades (part category 666), 
and trousers, breeches and shorts (category 847). 
46.  See Committee on Safeguards (2005c,d). Webb, Camminati, and Thorne (2005) 
addressed the choice of safeguard action versus antidumping action on the part of 
the Peruvian government. 
47.  These safeguards cover synthetic fabrics, textured polyester threads, silks, 
velvets, sweaters and pullovers, embroidery, and knitted shirts.   S. Kim and K. Reinert 
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48.  It is again worth noting that Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Peru are members 
of the International Textiles and Clothing Bureau, an exporters group generally 
opposed to the use of safeguards. 
49.  See WTO Committee on Safeguards (2005b). 
50.  See WTO Committee on Safeguards (2005e), para. 64. 
51.  See WTO Committee on Safeguards (2004a).  
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